Not the full picture. Built from public records, which leave things out.Read by hand, Oct 2026DetailsThis is built from public records, which leave a lot out, and some of it may be wrong or out of date. Check the sources, and tell us if you spot a mistake. What this site can't tell you Read by hand. We read Ottawa's own documents for this site in October 2026; the Sources page lists which ones. The comparisons with other places still come from the Province's yearly reports.
Questions · 10 so far
Things worth asking about
We read Ottawa's financial reports and meeting minutes. These are the things that stood out.
What these are, and what they are not. A question here means a number or practice is unusual, or harder to see than it should be. It does not mean anyone did anything wrong. Most unusual numbers turn out to have ordinary explanations, and every question lists some. The only way to know is to ask.
Worth asking
Worth asking
There may well be a good reason. It is still worth asking what it is.
$36.1 millionthe 10% contingency for the event centre and north-side stands, on a construction estimate of $418.8 million
Lansdowne Park is the city’s stadium and shopping district, run with a private partner (OSEG). The city plans to build a new event centre and new north-side stands there. The Auditor General looked again at the plan in November 2025 and said the 10% “contingency” (money set aside for surprises) may not be enough over a five-year build, and that if it runs out the city could need more debt. The city agreed to report to Council on the contingency twice a year from 2026.
Found by reading the city's own documents · 7 sources
$5.0 millionless for affordable housing ($14.4 million instead of $19.4 million) after $10 million went to parking
In November 2023 Council said part of the money from selling the air rights above the north-side stands should go to the Affordable Housing Reserve Fund. The city then set aside $10.0 million of those proceeds for the new parking, which lowered the housing share by $5.0 million. The Auditor General said this "may not be aligned with Council’s expectations" and asked the City Manager to check with Council. The city said Council would decide on November 7, 2025.
Found by reading the city's own documents · 4 sources
$41,309,146red light camera revenue from 2021 to 2024, none of it paid into the Road Safety Reserve Fund
In December 2019 Council directed that revenue from red light cameras installed after 2020 go to road safety work. The Auditor General found in November 2025 that none of it has. All red light camera revenue from 2021 to 2024 went to the city’s regular budget, with a yearly share to Ottawa Police. Management had set its own $11.75 million baseline and said money would only move once revenue passed it. It never did. The city agreed to bring a new approach to Council by the fourth quarter of 2025.
Found by reading the city's own documents · 4 sources
$80,000added to each councillor’s office budget in April 2025, with $50,000 more in January 2026
Each councillor gets a yearly "Constituency Services Budget" for office staff, events and supplies. In April 2025 Council added $80,000 to each councillor’s budget, with $50,000 more in January 2026. This followed a consultant’s review. The Auditor General’s audit found every expense it tested followed the rules. It also found that the public expense lists are shown net of "budget credits", so some offices’ spending is understated, and that almost half of the wards had more than $10,000 left unspent in 2024.
Found by reading the city's own documents · 6 sources
12.25%the effective interest rate printed for the Stage 2 Trillium Line P3 liability, against 6.47% on the Stage 1 private debt
The Trillium Line extension was built under a "P3" (a public-private partnership): a private group designed, built and financed it and will maintain it for 27 years. In 2024 the city started to show what it owes the group as a $135,759 thousand liability. Its own notes call the interest "an annual effective interest rate of 12.25%", about $106,261 thousand over the term. The city’s notes list debentures at 0.00% to 6.00% and the Stage 1 light rail private debt at 6.47%.
Found by reading the city's own documents · 4 sources
8 instructorsthe number of OC Transpo instructors the private partner was to train and certify, who then trained the train operators
In February 2025 the Auditor General reported on tips it received through the city’s fraud and waste hotline about training for the new Trillium Line. It could not see evidence that the instructors had the experience and training expected before they began teaching train operators. It found training records incomplete. It also found the city did not get the training materials it expected from the private partner (TransitNext) and had to add its own curriculum writers at extra cost. Management says the gaps were fixed before passengers rode the line on January 6, 2025.
Found by reading the city's own documents · 4 sources
7 of 10people appointed without a competition to long-term manager jobs who did not meet the posted requirements
In March 2026 the Auditor General reported on hotline tips about hiring of managers at OC Transpo between 2021 and 2025. It confirmed the allegations about appointments. It found 10 cases where a permanent job, or a temporary job longer than 12 months, was filled without a competition, and 7 of those 10 people did not meet the job’s education or experience requirement. Management agreed and said it would fix its process by the third quarter of 2026.
Found by reading the city's own documents · 3 sources
3 of 6sampled new-build files where the city could not show critical deficiencies were resolved before the occupancy permit
In 2025 the Auditor General investigated hotline tips about building permits and occupancy permits. For three of six large new buildings it sampled, the city could not show that serious open problems were fixed before the occupancy permit was issued. It also found projects with no overall occupancy permit or final inspection on file, some with partial inspections dating from 2018 to 2021. The Auditor General said it could not conclude that all checks were done, not that they were skipped.
Found by reading the city's own documents · 3 sources
$12,209,826City-wide cash-in-lieu allocated to projects in 2024 and 2025, with no formal plan for how to use it
When a developer builds, the city can take cash instead of land for parks ("cash-in-lieu"). Sixty per cent goes to an account for the ward where the building went up, and forty per cent goes to a city-wide account. The Auditor General found councillors in practice choose how ward money is spent, and several kept their own priorities after staff suggested a different order, without writing down why. It found no plan for the city-wide money and found the yearly public report is late or missing required details. The city agreed to a new policy, but not until the third quarter of 2027.
Found by reading the city's own documents · 7 sources
$741.9 millionincrease in net debt during 2024, to $4,108,957 thousand
Net debt is what the city owes minus its cash, investments and other money it is owed. It measures how much future income is already spoken for. The audited 2024 statements show net debt of $4,108,957 thousand, up from $3,366,968 thousand a year earlier. The city’s annual report gives reasons: a new $135.8 million liability for the Trillium Line, more mortgages for Ottawa Community Housing, and more government money received but not yet spent. It also lists $225 million of new borrowing against $146 million repaid.
Found by reading the city's own documents · 3 sources
$36.1 millionthe 10% contingency for the event centre and north-side stands, on a construction estimate of $418.8 million
Lansdowne Park is the city’s stadium and shopping district, run with a private partner (OSEG). The city plans to build a new event centre and new north-side stands there. The Auditor General looked again at the plan in November 2025 and said the 10% “contingency” (money set aside for surprises) may not be enough over a five-year build, and that if it runs out the city could need more debt. The city agreed to report to Council on the contingency twice a year from 2026.
Why it matters
The city plans to borrow $331.0 million for this project (a 40-year term at 4.25%). If building costs rise more than the cushion allows, the extra comes from the same taxpayers and reserves that pay for everything else.
It could be because…
The Auditor General noted that “hard construction costs are fixed” by the tender price, so only the extras (soft costs, escalation, links to the housing towers) can still move.
A 10% contingency is what the city’s own Estimating Guide calls for, and the Auditor General said it “aligns” with that guide.
The Auditor General said it was not telling Council whether to build, only pointing to risks; Council can top up the cushion or find savings later.
Questions you could ask
If the $36.1 million cushion is used up before the event centre is finished, where does the extra money come from, and who decides?
Will the twice-a-year contingency reports promised for 2026 be posted where residents can read them?
The Auditor General said over 1,500 bidder questions could mean some tender requirements were unclear. What has the city done so they do not become change orders?
You can ask during the public part of a council meeting, by writing to the clerk, or by contacting your councillors. How to reach council.
Speak for Ottawa?Send us your answer and we will publish it with this question.
The evidence
The Auditor General wrote that "there is a risk that the City’s contingency of 10% for the project may not be sufficient to cover all unforeseen costs. If this risk was to materialize, it could require the City to take on additional debt."
The project estimate is now $418.8 million for the Event Centre and North Side Stands. The city’s "10% contingency allowance ($36.1 million for the Event Centre and North Side Stands; $1.7 million for the underground parking) aligns with the City’s Estimating Guide." The Auditor General added: "we believe the contingency represents the minimum buffer for a project of this magnitude and duration."
In the 2024 audit the Auditor General found the construction estimate "could be understated by approximately $74.3 million (17.7%) for the Event Centre and North Side Stands".
The planned debt has gone up from $312.7 million in 2023 to $331.0 million, "an increase of $18.3 million or 5.9%", because the construction cost stayed about the same but the expected help from other levels of government was removed.
The Auditor General noted that "the bid deadline was extended by approximately 2.5 months and generated over 1,500 bidder questions seeking clarification of, and in some instances modifications to, both technical requirements and contract terms."
The city’s response: management "will provide semi-annual status updates to Council. Updates will include construction progress and the financial status, including status on the construction costs and contingency of the project, commencing in 2026."
Table 3, funding sources for the $418.8 million estimate: the row "Debt (40-Year Term @ 4.25%)" shows 312.7 ($ millions, 2023) and 331.0 (2025). Elsewhere the report refers to "a 40-year bond of $331.0 million".
$5.0 millionless for affordable housing ($14.4 million instead of $19.4 million) after $10 million went to parking
In November 2023 Council said part of the money from selling the air rights above the north-side stands should go to the Affordable Housing Reserve Fund. The city then set aside $10.0 million of those proceeds for the new parking, which lowered the housing share by $5.0 million. The Auditor General said this "may not be aligned with Council’s expectations" and asked the City Manager to check with Council. The city said Council would decide on November 7, 2025.
Why it matters
The air rights sale is expected to bring in $65.0 million, and the plan counts on it to help pay for construction. How it is split decides how much is left for affordable housing, which Council had set out to fund.
It could be because…
Moving the money between pots did not change how much the city borrows overall, and Council was asked to make the final call.
The parking is built for the residential towers, so charging part of the air rights sale to it can be seen as a fair cost of the sale.
The sale price ($65.0 million) was far above the 2023 estimate ($39.0 million), so the housing share still rose.
Questions you could ask
What did Council decide on November 7, 2025 about how the air rights money is split? (We could not open the city’s meeting records, so we did not find the answer.)
If the parking now breaks even only because $10 million was assigned to it, what pays for the parking if its revenue falls short?
You can ask during the public part of a council meeting, by writing to the clerk, or by contacting your councillors. How to reach council.
Speak for Ottawa?Send us your answer and we will publish it with this question.
The evidence
Council’s November 2023 motion directed "25% of the first $39 million and 50% of any proceeds beyond the first $39 million from the sale of air rights to be allocated to the Affordable Housing Reserve Fund." The Auditor General found that "the allocation of $10 million to parking has reduced this contribution by $5.0 million, down to $14.4 million which may not be aligned with Council’s expectations."
Without the allocation the housing contribution would be $19.4M; with it, $14.4M. The allocation also changes the parking numbers: the 2023 staff report expected an annual loss of $600,000 on the parking, and "the assumed operating and lifecycle costs will now equate to the expected revenues to be generated from the parking (i.e. break even)".
In the funding table the sale price of the subterranean and property air rights is 39.0 ($ millions) in the 2023 plan and 65.0 in the 2025 plan. The contribution to affordable housing is (3.9) in 2023 and (14.4) in 2025.
The Auditor General recommended that "The City Manager should confirm with City Council whether the internal allocation is appropriate for purposes of calculating the contribution to affordable housing and aligned with the intent of the original motion." The city’s response: "Council will make the final determination on this at the November 7, 2025 Council meeting."
$41,309,146red light camera revenue from 2021 to 2024, none of it paid into the Road Safety Reserve Fund
In December 2019 Council directed that revenue from red light cameras installed after 2020 go to road safety work. The Auditor General found in November 2025 that none of it has. All red light camera revenue from 2021 to 2024 went to the city’s regular budget, with a yearly share to Ottawa Police. Management had set its own $11.75 million baseline and said money would only move once revenue passed it. It never did. The city agreed to bring a new approach to Council by the fourth quarter of 2025.
Why it matters
The program’s stated aim is road safety. The Auditor General said not following the direction can "impact the level of public trust in the program".
It could be because…
Management read Council’s direction as meaning only revenue above a baseline, and assumed it would not hurt the operating budget.
Revenue fell short of the $11.75 million baseline each year, which management put down to changed driver behaviour and the pandemic.
The Auditor General’s figure of about $10.7 million is gross, before unpaid tickets, so the true amount that could have moved is lower.
About one fifth of the money went to Ottawa Police to close a funding gap, which was decided in 2019.
Questions you could ask
Did the city bring the new approach to Council in the fourth quarter of 2025 or with the 2026 budget, as it promised, and what did Council decide?
Since the province ended automated speed cameras in November 2025, how much camera revenue is still expected, and where will it go?
You can ask during the public part of a council meeting, by writing to the clerk, or by contacting your councillors. How to reach council.
Speak for Ottawa?Send us your answer and we will publish it with this question.
The evidence
The Auditor General wrote: "Since that Council direction, no revenues from net new red light cameras has been allocated to the Road Safety Reserve Fund." Council’s direction (ACS2019-TSD-TRF-0009) was approved in December 2019.
Total red light camera revenue was $7,188,646 in 2021, $10,558,302 in 2022, $12,275,021 in 2023 and $11,287,177 in 2024: $41,309,146 in all, of which $32,907,821 went to the city’s operating budget and $8,401,325 to Ottawa Police. Management "internally set a baseline at $11.75M" and the program "has fallen short of the established baseline target of $11.75M set by management since 2021".
The Auditor General estimated "approximately $10.7M" in gross revenue came from the cameras installed after 2020. The city’s response: the approach "will be presented to City Council in Q4 2025 as part of the 2025 Road Safety Action Plan report or when the 2026 Draft Budget is tabled."
The Office’s 2025 annual report repeats the finding and adds that "As of November 2025, Bill 56 – Building a More Competitive Economy Act (2025) received Royal Assent, under which the authorization of the use Automated Speed Enforcement cameras was repealed by the Province of Ontario."
$80,000added to each councillor’s office budget in April 2025, with $50,000 more in January 2026
Each councillor gets a yearly "Constituency Services Budget" for office staff, events and supplies. In April 2025 Council added $80,000 to each councillor’s budget, with $50,000 more in January 2026. This followed a consultant’s review. The Auditor General’s audit found every expense it tested followed the rules. It also found that the public expense lists are shown net of "budget credits", so some offices’ spending is understated, and that almost half of the wards had more than $10,000 left unspent in 2024.
Why it matters
This is money councillors decide how to spend, and it rose in the term before an election. Residents rely on the public list to see what was spent.
It could be because…
A consultant (MNP) reviewed the budgets and recommended the increase, mainly to pay office staff fairly; Council approved it by motion.
The Auditor General found large pay gaps between councillors’ assistants for similar work, which a bigger budget and a pay scale are meant to fix.
Money left unspent can be small compared with a $287,698 budget, and councillors personally owe any overspending, so some keep a buffer.
The city has agreed to publish expenses gross of credits starting with expenses filed in 2026.
Questions you could ask
If almost half of the wards ended 2024 with more than $10,000 unspent, how did Council decide that $80,000 more per office was needed?
Will the 2022 to 2025 disclosures be restated gross of credits, or only expenses filed from 2026?
You can ask during the public part of a council meeting, by writing to the clerk, or by contacting your councillors. How to reach council.
Speak for Ottawa?Send us your answer and we will publish it with this question.
The evidence
Each councillor’s Constituency Services Budget was $287,698 in 2024 and $367,698 in 2025. The Mayor’s was $1,000,520 in 2024 and $1,301,827 in 2025.
As directed through Motion 2025-50-14, "Council approved an $80,000 increase to each Councillor’s budget in April 2025, with an additional $50,000 increase scheduled for". The sentence ends on page 10: "January 2026."
Average salaries per full-time position "ranged across wards by 42.5% in 2024" and "46% of wards had ended 2024 with more than $10,000 of the Constituency Services Budget unspent."
The audit "found that the Policy is clear and generally well understood by Members of Council and their staff. All expenses tested complied with the Policy, were properly approved, were supported by core documentation and were within budget limits."
The Auditor General found "Public disclosures are presented net of budget credits, resulting in an understatement of reported expenses." For example the Planning Committee Chair receives $83,333 per year and certain other committee and board chairs $41,667. The city agreed to show "actual gross expenses, including any credits received, beginning with expenses filed in 2026."
12.25%the effective interest rate printed for the Stage 2 Trillium Line P3 liability, against 6.47% on the Stage 1 private debt
The Trillium Line extension was built under a "P3" (a public-private partnership): a private group designed, built and financed it and will maintain it for 27 years. In 2024 the city started to show what it owes the group as a $135,759 thousand liability. Its own notes call the interest "an annual effective interest rate of 12.25%", about $106,261 thousand over the term. The city’s notes list debentures at 0.00% to 6.00% and the Stage 1 light rail private debt at 6.47%.
Why it matters
Under a P3 the city pays a fee each year for decades. A high financing rate means more of those payments are interest rather than the train line itself.
It could be because…
The rate is worked out from the 2019 contract. It may include payment for risk the private group carries (late finish, repairs for 27 years), not just the cost of borrowing.
The Stage 1 and Stage 2 deals were struck in different years, with different interest rates in the market and different risk.
This is the first year the city used the new accounting standard for P3s, so how the rate is worked out may be an accounting method, not a new cost.
Questions you could ask
How is the 12.25% rate worked out, and what share of it pays for risks the private group took on?
What would the same payments have cost if the city had borrowed the money itself at its own rates, and was that compared before the 2019 contract?
You can ask during the public part of a council meeting, by writing to the clerk, or by contacting your councillors. How to reach council.
Speak for Ottawa?Send us your answer and we will publish it with this question.
The evidence
The Stage 2 Trillium Line P3 liability is $135,759 (thousand). The note says the $136,126 liability was recognized when the line reached substantial completion in November 2024, "to be repaid by the City during the 27- year maintenance term" and that "The interest charged is approximately $106,261, which is an annual effective interest rate of 12.25%." Future payments total $240,572, of which $104,813 is interest.
For Stage 1 light rail, the private group obtained "$225,000 of debt financing and $75,000 of equity financing". The note says "This long-term debt is at an interest rate of 6.47% and will mature on May 24, 2048."
The city’s own debentures are "issued at various rates of interest ranging from 0.00% to 6.00%, and maturing from 2025 to 2053", totalling $3,298,348 (thousand).
The note says the city adopted the new public-private partnership standard PS 3160 on January 1, 2024, and that the "agreement is for a period of 27 years".
8 instructorsthe number of OC Transpo instructors the private partner was to train and certify, who then trained the train operators
In February 2025 the Auditor General reported on tips it received through the city’s fraud and waste hotline about training for the new Trillium Line. It could not see evidence that the instructors had the experience and training expected before they began teaching train operators. It found training records incomplete. It also found the city did not get the training materials it expected from the private partner (TransitNext) and had to add its own curriculum writers at extra cost. Management says the gaps were fixed before passengers rode the line on January 6, 2025.
Why it matters
The Trillium Line runs diesel trains on long stretches of single track. How operators are trained is part of keeping riders safe.
It could be because…
The federal rule on instructor experience did not take effect until the line opened for passengers, and the Auditor General noted that management could show all on-job instructors met its own reading of the rule.
The old line’s drivers mostly worked as relief staff, so finding anyone with 24 straight months of full-time experience was hard.
The Auditor General said management made fixes before the line opened and that other safety controls (such as automatic braking) were in place.
Questions you could ask
What did the extra curriculum work cost the city, and was any of it recovered from the private partner?
Has the Auditor General’s follow-up confirmed that the five recommendations were carried out?
You can ask during the public part of a council meeting, by writing to the clerk, or by contacting your councillors. How to reach council.
Speak for Ottawa?Send us your answer and we will publish it with this question.
The evidence
The Auditor General wrote: "evidence available could not demonstrate that specific Trillium Line operator instructors had the expected experience and training prior to commencing instruction." It also noted that "the City did not receive the training deliverables aligned with its expectations and had to supplement with its own curriculum developers, at an additional cost."
The agreement says the private partner was responsible for "training and certifying eight (8) OC Transpo Trainers (diesel rail instructors) and twelve (12) diesel rail controllers".
The federal regulator told the Auditor General that "not less than two years’ service as a locomotive engineer" implies "a minimum of 24 consecutive months working as a full-time locomotive engineer; this was a much stricter definition than was being used by management." On that reading "the majority of the on-job training instructors would not have met this requirement."
The Auditor General wrote that "As soon as any issue was identified, it was brought to management’s attention, and we understand that management initiated immediate remediation actions before revenue service." The investigation ran between July and December 2024, and revenue service began January 6, 2025.
7 of 10people appointed without a competition to long-term manager jobs who did not meet the posted requirements
In March 2026 the Auditor General reported on hotline tips about hiring of managers at OC Transpo between 2021 and 2025. It confirmed the allegations about appointments. It found 10 cases where a permanent job, or a temporary job longer than 12 months, was filled without a competition, and 7 of those 10 people did not meet the job’s education or experience requirement. Management agreed and said it would fix its process by the third quarter of 2026.
Why it matters
Hiring on merit is the city’s own policy. Skipping a competition can mean better-qualified people never get a chance, and it can hurt staff trust.
It could be because…
The rules allow appointments in some cases, and the Auditor General said they can be the most effective choice when used properly.
Management says it believed it hired experienced people suited to the jobs; the Auditor General said job descriptions may be out of date and should be re-evaluated.
The Auditor General looked only at cases raised in hotline reports, and did not test how common the problem is.
Questions you could ask
Have the managers appointed without a competition since 2021 been re-assessed, and what was decided about the seven who did not meet the requirements?
Will the Auditor General’s planned Human Resources audit (2026-2027 work plan) look at the whole city, not just OC Transpo?
You can ask during the public part of a council meeting, by writing to the clerk, or by contacting your councillors. How to reach council.
Speak for Ottawa?Send us your answer and we will publish it with this question.
The evidence
"New positions, permanent vacancies and temporary vacancies of more than 12 months should be posted for competition." The Auditor General "identified 10 contraventions of this requirement" and "7 of the 10 individuals appointed did not meet the education or the experience requirement of the position".
The conclusion says the investigation "substantiated the allegations related to the use of appointments by OC Transpo." The scope notes say that "Further elements may be considered as part of the Audit of Human Resources that was approved as part the OAG’s 2026-2027 Audit Work Plan." The conclusion adds: "management has indicated that they felt they hired experienced individuals who were well suited to these roles."
3 of 6sampled new-build files where the city could not show critical deficiencies were resolved before the occupancy permit
In 2025 the Auditor General investigated hotline tips about building permits and occupancy permits. For three of six large new buildings it sampled, the city could not show that serious open problems were fixed before the occupancy permit was issued. It also found projects with no overall occupancy permit or final inspection on file, some with partial inspections dating from 2018 to 2021. The Auditor General said it could not conclude that all checks were done, not that they were skipped.
Why it matters
An occupancy permit tells people a building is safe to use. If the paper trail is missing, nobody can prove the problems were fixed.
It could be because…
Management says an inspector would not issue an occupancy permit if all problems had not been cleared, even where the paper record is missing.
The sampled buildings were large, multi-storey ones, whose design is also checked by outside professionals the city relies on.
The city was moving from an old records system to new software in 2024, which can explain gaps in older files.
Questions you could ask
Were the open files from 2018 to 2021 closed out, and were any of the three sampled buildings found to still have open safety items?
Did the Chief Building Official’s four recommendations get done by the third quarter of 2025, as promised?
You can ask during the public part of a council meeting, by writing to the clerk, or by contacting your councillors. How to reach council.
Speak for Ottawa?Send us your answer and we will publish it with this question.
The evidence
From a sample of "six (6) new build projects", the Auditor General found that "For three (3) files, evidence could not be provided to demonstrate that outstanding deficiencies were resolved before the issuance of the occupancy permit and completion of the final inspection."
The city’s explanation: "Management has attested that even though the documentation was not consistently available, a City Inspector would not issue an occupancy permit if all deficiencies had not been cleared." Management also noted the buildings were "larger, multi-storey buildings, which are also subject to review by third party professionals".
Seven projects had no final inspection or full occupancy permit on file. For three of them "the last partial inspection dates on file were between 2018 and 2021". The Chief Building Official agreed with the first recommendation: "The recommendation will be completed by Q3 2025."
$12,209,826City-wide cash-in-lieu allocated to projects in 2024 and 2025, with no formal plan for how to use it
When a developer builds, the city can take cash instead of land for parks ("cash-in-lieu"). Sixty per cent goes to an account for the ward where the building went up, and forty per cent goes to a city-wide account. The Auditor General found councillors in practice choose how ward money is spent, and several kept their own priorities after staff suggested a different order, without writing down why. It found no plan for the city-wide money and found the yearly public report is late or missing required details. The city agreed to a new policy, but not until the third quarter of 2027.
Why it matters
This is public money from growth, paid out in the ward where growth happens. The Auditor General said uneven choices may "create perceptions that spending decisions are politically motivated".
It could be because…
Ward councillors know their neighbourhoods; the Auditor General said their input has real value and the sampled projects all met the policy.
Payments after September 2022 were held until the appeals of the new parkland by-law were resolved, which slowed planning; half was released in December 2025.
The city introduced a pilot intake process in 2025 and plans more staff to help projects get planned.
Questions you could ask
Can the city publish each ward’s cash-in-lieu balance and projects now, rather than waiting for 2027?
Why wait until the third quarter of 2027, after the next council is seated, to make the final spending authority clear?
You can ask during the public part of a council meeting, by writing to the clerk, or by contacting your councillors. How to reach council.
Speak for Ottawa?Send us your answer and we will publish it with this question.
The evidence
"In fiscal years 2024 and 2025, a total of $12,209,826 in City-wide cash-in-lieu was allocated to projects, with 71% directed towards benefit to existing contributions."
The audit found that "several Councillors opted to proceed with their original priorities, and rationales for deviating from staff recommendations were not documented." In Toronto, "final decision‑making authority rests with staff rather than elected officials."
The 2023 annual report "was not published until December 2024, several months after the Policy’s first-quarter deadline", and the 2024 report "provided only high‑level financial information". The city’s response sets full reporting "starting in Q1 2027".
The audit found "there is currently no formal plan or strategy guiding these decisions" for the City-wide funds, so "spending tends to be ad hoc and reactive to emerging needs."
$741.9 millionincrease in net debt during 2024, to $4,108,957 thousand
Net debt is what the city owes minus its cash, investments and other money it is owed. It measures how much future income is already spoken for. The audited 2024 statements show net debt of $4,108,957 thousand, up from $3,366,968 thousand a year earlier. The city’s annual report gives reasons: a new $135.8 million liability for the Trillium Line, more mortgages for Ottawa Community Housing, and more government money received but not yet spent. It also lists $225 million of new borrowing against $146 million repaid.
Why it matters
Stage 2 light rail, housing and other large projects are paid partly by borrowing. Net debt shows the size of the bill that will fall on future budgets.
It could be because…
Big building projects (like Stage 2 light rail) are paid over many years, so debt rises while they are built and before the benefits arrive.
The statements show the city owns $23,781,983 thousand of tangible capital assets, far more than its net debt.
Some of the rise is a change in accounting: the Trillium Line liability appeared in 2024 under a new accounting rule for public-private partnerships.
Questions you could ask
How much of the $741.9 million came from projects the province or federal government will pay back, and how much falls on city taxpayers?
What is the city’s plan for net debt over the next five years, and where is it published?
You can ask during the public part of a council meeting, by writing to the clerk, or by contacting your councillors. How to reach council.
Speak for Ottawa?Send us your answer and we will publish it with this question.
The evidence
Net debt at December 31, 2024 was (4,108,957) and at December 31, 2023 was (3,366,968), in thousands of dollars. Tangible capital assets are 23,781,983.
"Net debt increased by $741.9 million during 2024." The report says the P3 liability of $135.8 million is new and relates to the Trillium Line Extension, that net long-term debt rose because of "$225 million of new debt issues and loans" offset by "$146 million of debt principal repayments", and that deferred revenue rose by $208.0 million because of government money "received in 2024 but not yet recognized as revenue".
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